{"id":3074,"date":"2025-12-17T15:11:21","date_gmt":"2025-12-17T14:11:21","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/medialatitudes.be\/en\/?p=3074"},"modified":"2026-01-10T15:31:39","modified_gmt":"2026-01-10T14:31:39","slug":"israel-iran-war-i-would-say-that-a-death-sentence-or-execution-is-probably-never-a-fully-legitimate-judicial-outcome-2-4","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/medialatitudes.be\/en\/israel-iran-war-i-would-say-that-a-death-sentence-or-execution-is-probably-never-a-fully-legitimate-judicial-outcome-2-4\/","title":{"rendered":"Israel-Iran War : “I would say that a death sentence or execution is probably never a\u2028fully legitimate judicial outcome” (2\/3)"},"content":{"rendered":"

As part of an ongoing series on the Iran-Israel war, LATITUDES had an exclusive interview with Dr. Mai Sato, UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Iran, to examine the state of human rights in the country<\/a>, particularly in the months following the conflict. <\/span><\/p>\n

In this in-depth conversation, we discuss the challenges facing civil society, political prisoners, and marginalized communities, religious and ethnic minorities, offering a closer look at the evolving landscape of human rights and organized repression in Iran.<\/span><\/p>\n

In the days following the Iran\u2013Israel war, executions sharply increased.\u2028What concrete indicators show this surge is the result of state policy\u2028rather than isolated judicial actions?<\/strong><\/p>\n

“Maybe I should start by clarifying that the 1.200 executions are obviously figures\u2028collected by civil Society; these are not state figures, it’s between January and\u2028October this year. We cannot say after the Israel\u2013Iran military escalation\u2026 executions\u2028have dramatically increased. The executions had already been rising since last\u2028year. Last year, figures were over 1.000, and this year, by October, they had\u2028already reached at least 1.200. So, I think it\u2019s inaccurate to say that after the\u2028twelve-day war, there was a massive surge in executions.<\/em><\/p>\n

“So, there\u2019s been a rise in\u2028the number of espionage-related executions.”<\/em><\/strong><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

In January, this was again collected by civil society there were around 80\u2028executions. In March, it was a bit lower, about 60. Then in April, it went up to over\u2028120. In May, nearly 160. During July and August, it went down a bit to around 100.\u2028And now we\u2019re seeing around 160 again for the last couple of months.\u2028So yes, executions have increased, but I wouldn\u2019t pinpoint the causality solely to\u2028the military escalation. But one thing I would see a correlation with is the number\u2028of executions for espionage charges. There have been 12 executions between\u2028January and October this year for espionage; 10 of those were carried out after\u2028the 13th of June.\u2028And if you want to compare those figures with previous years, in 2023, we know\u2028of six executions for espionage; in 2024, five executions. So, there\u2019s been a rise in\u2028the number of espionage-related executions, and a rapid rise after the 13th of\u2028June.”<\/em><\/p>\n

What, in your view, explains the Iranian government\u2019s post-war\u2028intensification of espionage accusations, now applied so readily to\u2028journalists, activists, and even ordinary citizens?\u2028<\/strong><\/p>\n

“I should start by clarifying that espionage was already a capital offense, and as of\u2028the first of October, there is a new law on espionage that expands counter\u2028espionage. And as you rightly point out, it now includes, for example, giving\u2028information to foreign media and so forth. So yes, the concern is that more\u2028people could be executed under broadly defined national-security offenses, with\u2028the definition of espionage expanding. And I think this is definitely a kind of\u2028knock-on effect of the military escalation, because the new law was introduced\u2028and passed immediately after the military escalation had started.”\u2028<\/em><\/p>\n

What evidence points to the use of executions as a tool of social control\u2028and intimidation, rather than legitimate judicial outcomes?\u2028<\/strong><\/p>\n

“That’s a very interesting question. Not just Iran, but in any country that has the\u2028death penalty, I would say that a death sentence or execution is probably never a\u2028fully legitimate judicial outcome. As you know, under international human rights\u2028law, one could argue that it still permits the use of the death penalty in limited <\/em>circumstances, but I think the UN’s position now is that it should be applied only\u2028in a way that does not violate international standards.<\/em><\/p>\n

“Any country that is currently carrying out executions, including\u2028Iran, is doing so primarily for retributive reasons or as a tool of social control.”<\/em><\/strong><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

\u2028I take the view that most executions are probably not legitimate judicially. <\/em>I believe most executions lack judicial legitimacy. In Iran, of the roughly 1,200 executions recorded so far, about half involved ordinary crimes such as murder, while the rest concerned security-related charges and sexual offenses that clearly violate international human rights standards. These cases are further undermined by a lack of transparency, due process, and fair trials. Moreover, there is no academic consensus that the death penalty is more effective than other punishments, suggesting that executions in Iran, as elsewhere, are primarily used for retribution and social control.<\/p>\n

Given your account of the transfer of political prisoners and the dire\u2028conditions of women in Qarchak prison, what more can you tell us about\u2028the situation in other prisons that receives less media attention?\u2028<\/strong><\/p>\n

“You’ve mentioned a few points about the treatment of prisoners. I think the\u2028first part of your question was about the transfer of prisoners from Evin to\u2028Qarchak and Greater Tehran prisons, particularly for political prisoners. During\u2028that time, many of them have since been moved back. What was really\u2028revealing to me was that once the women political prisoners were moved to\u2028Qarchak prison, we heard news of several women prisoners\u2019 deaths in custody.\u2028I rarely hear about death cases in custody in other prisoners, though there are\u2028many stories of medical neglect in Evin prison. I think that really highlights how\u2028little we know about what happens beyond Evin prison. They also have ways to\u2028communicate with those outside the prison and with the wider community,\u2028and have access to international media, which I found very telling. This also\u2028raises concerns about the treatment in other prisons that we don\u2019t know\u2028about.”<\/em><\/p>\n

What do the coordinated prison protests such as \u2018No Execution\u2028Tuesdays\u2019 and the recent hunger strike by Reza Khandan<\/a> and\u2028others reveal about the treatment, vulnerability, and communication\u2028limits of political prisoners, and about their resilience under tightly\u2028controlled conditions?<\/strong><\/p>\n

“You mentioned the protests. I think it’s remarkable that, despite being tightly\u2028controlled in detention conditions, protests are happening inside\u2028those prisons. You mentioned a couple of recent cases, but I think there has\u2028been ongoing coordinated resistance within the prisons, with prisoners\u2028resisting moves to solitary confinement cells. I think the campaign \u201cNo\u2028Execution Tuesdays\u201d has been carried out.\u2028Since, I believe, the beginning of 2024, prisoners participating in the \u201cNo\u2028Execution Tuesdays\u201d campaign have been going on hunger strikes to protest\u2028executions. You also mentioned coordinated protests: since October in\u2028Qarchak prison, following the death of women prisoners, as well as another\u2028coordinated protest involving 1.500 prisoners in Qezel Hesar prison to protest\u2028the surge in executions. These protests reveal not only the daily realities inside\u2028the prisons but also the remarkable strength and resilience of those prisoners\u2028inside an extremely controlled environment.”<\/em><\/p>\n

Some reports suggest that new restrictive measures have been\u2028introduced for prisoners who protest or speak out in Iran. Do you\u2028consider these restrictions to be new, and how have such measures been\u2028applied historically?\u2028<\/strong><\/p>\n

“I wouldn’t call them new restrictions. I think these measures have been used for\u2028some time. There is also a regulation, from 2021, that outlines the consequences\u2028prisoners may face if they organize a strike, which can include temporary bans on\u2028visitation or furlough, transfers to other prisons, and, in some cases, loss of\u2028eligibility for pardon. But even before this regulation, those who protested or\u2028spoke the truth against the authorities were met with similar consequences. So, I\u2028wouldn’t necessarily describe these as new restrictive measures; I think these\u2028repercussions and tactics have always existed.”<\/em><\/p>\n

Based on the reports on Baha\u2019is situations in Iran<\/a>, how has the nature of\u2028repression against the Bah\u00e1\u2019\u00ed community evolved, especially in the context\u2028of recent military escalations?\u2028<\/strong><\/p>\n

“You might be referring to a side event that was organized last year for the general\u2028assembly. It was not my report. The report was published by an Australian\u2028University, and I was there as part of the guests to celebrate the launch of the\u2028report.<\/em>
\nSo maybe I’ll answer that in two parts. I think in my current general assembly\u2028report that I represented last month, I talked about the intensification of repression\u2028against the Bahai\u2019s especially after the military escalations. I think the Baha have\u2028been they sort of the used to escape goats for the linkage with Israel\u2028collaboration, espionage, and so forth, but that also isn’t new.<\/em><\/p>\n

“There are other forms in which the Bahai community human rights protection\u2028is violated.”<\/em><\/strong><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

I think that was a\u2028charge broad against the Bahai\u2019s for many years, but I think that has been\u2028intensified. In terms of the findings of the report that was published a year ago\u2028what that report talks about is the changing nature of persecutions that in the\u202880\u2019s for example there were more executions and more recent years what we see\u2028that we don’t really hear about the Bahai\u2019s being sentenced to death or executed\u2028but there are other forms in which the Bahai community human rights protection\u2028is violated.”<\/em><\/p>\n

Based on the report published last year by the Australian university, what\u2028were the key findings?<\/strong><\/p>\n

“The report published last year discusses the changing nature of repression against\u2028the Bah\u00e1\u2019\u00eds. In the past, it often involved loss of life through the state\u2019s lethal use\u2028of violence, but now it has shifted toward more structural and cultural forms of\u2028violence, such as limited access to higher education, employment, and so on.\u2028The report argued that this marks a change, like repression.\u2028On the second point, which relates more to recent repression, yes, you’re right:\u2028the Bah\u00e1\u2019\u00eds continue to face arbitrary arrests, violent raids on homes, raids on\u2028businesses, property confiscations, and increased surveillance. I wouldn\u2019t single\u2028out the Bah\u00e1\u2019\u00ed community compared to other religious and ethnic minorities, but\u2028there has definitely been an intensification of repression and surveillance.”<\/em><\/p>\n

In your assessment, what are the main factors driving the intensified\u2028persecution of the Baluch population and the Sunni minority in both\u2028Sistan\u2013Baluchistan and Kurdistan?<\/strong><\/p>\n

“Let me start by noting that the Baluchi community is almost entirely Sunni. In the\u2028Kurdish community, I believe more than half are Sunni Muslims, while some are\u2028Shiia Muslims, and others practice indigenous minority religions, along with a\u2028small number of Christians and Jews.<\/em>
\nBased on the reports I have received, the arrest and intimidation of religious\u2028leaders and worshippers intensified after the 2022 protests. I believe this is linked\u2028to the fact that the regions of Kurdistan and Sistan Baluchistan were major\u2028centers of mobilization.”<\/em><\/p>\n

“I would also add that the widespread poverty particularly in\u2028Baluchistan significantly limits access to human-rights awareness.”<\/em><\/strong><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

However, I also want to emphasize that it would be too\u2028simplistic to attribute this solely to Sunni identity or religious minority status.\u2028Both Kurdistan and Sistan\u2013Baluchistan are not only Sunni-majority regions but\u2028also ethnic minority regions, and it is this intersection of identities that\u2028contributes to the heightened persecution of these communities.\u2028I would also add that the widespread poverty, particularly in\u2028Baluchistan, significantly limits access to human-rights awareness and legal\u2028representation, which in turn exacerbates the human-rights violations taking\u2028place there.”<\/em><\/p>\n

In your recent report to the Human Rights Council, you highlighted\u2028serious concerns regarding women’s discrimination and the lack of legal\u2028protection against domestic violence in Iran. Could you explain more\u2028about the elements?\u2028<\/strong><\/p>\n

“In my March report to the Human Rights Council, I focused on the gendered aspects of human rights in Iran, including femicides, honor-related killings, and cases where women become perpetrators of homicide. I also addressed the absence of criminalization of domestic violence, including marital rape. In June, the government withdrew the long-pending bill to protect the dignity and security of women after legislative changes weakened its core provisions. While a new, more progressive bill could be welcomed, its content remains uncertain.”<\/em><\/p>\n

How do you assess the current enforcement of Iran\u2019s hijab laws,\u2028particularly given reports of uneven implementation between major cities\u2028and more remote regions, and the increasing reliance on surveillance and\u2028business-based enforcement?<\/strong><\/p>\n

“I think there is a slightly more positive development on the hijab law: I believe the\u2028Law Protecting the Family Through the Promotion of Chastity and Hijab has not\u2028been enforced, but wearing a hijab remains mandatory. As you are aware, Article 638 of the penal code stipulates that women who appear in public without the prescribed hijab may be punished with imprisonment or a fine.\u2028Now, there is a question over the extent to which this is enforced. I am getting\u2028mixed reporting. I don\u2019t think there is much enforcement in, for example, Tehran,\u2028but I do receive reports of more enforcement in regional and remote areas. I also\u2028think the nature of enforcement is perhaps changing with more use of\u2028surveillance and more use of monitoring of businesses about the implementation of the hijab.”<\/em><\/p>\n

What are the most pressing human rights risks for children and juvenile\u2028offenders in Iran, particularly those facing execution?\u2028<\/strong><\/p>\n

“To understand the risks facing children and juvenile offenders in Iran, it’s\u2028important to understand the factors that often lead to offending in the first place.\u2028Child marriage, poverty, etc., represents a significant pathway into the criminal\u2028justice system<\/a>, as highlighted in cases like that of Goli Kouhkan.\u2028Early marriage can trap children, particularly girls, in cycles of abuse, poverty,\u2028and limited opportunities that may subsequently lead to involvement with the\u2028law, whether as victims who become criminalized or through circumstances\u2028arising from their vulnerable situations. <\/em><\/p>\n

“International law provides\u2028unambiguous guidance on these matters, establishing that children should never\u2028face execution and must be afforded special protections.”<\/em><\/strong><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

For those fortunate enough to secure\u2028release, they face the daunting task of restarting their lives whilst carrying the\u2028stigma of being an ex-offender, a burden that is particularly heavy for young\u2028people who should be beginning their adult lives with opportunities for <\/em>education, employment, and social integration. International law provides\u2028unambiguous guidance on these matters, establishing that children should never\u2028face execution and must be afforded special protections that recognize their\u2028developmental stage and capacity for rehabilitation.”<\/em><\/p>\n

If current trends continue, what trajectory do you foresee for human\u2028rights in Iran over the next 12 months, and what specific actions should\u2028states take now?\u2028<\/strong><\/p>\n

“The death penalty will likely continue to be used extensively, whilst civic space\u2028will continue shrinking, leaving civil society actors with even fewer opportunities\u2028to operate safely and effectively.\u2028States could humanitarian visa programs to protect Iranians at immediate risk.\u2028Increased funding for civil society organizations operating outside of Iran is\u2028essential to maintain documentation efforts and support networks. On\u2028transnational repression, states can also take proactive action to protect\u2028individuals at risk within their own borders. Police in host countries face\u2028significant challenges, as they must first build trust with victims who often distrust\u2028law enforcement based on their experiences back home. Police authorities also\u2028need specialized training on how to effectively handle reports of transnational\u2028repression, recognizing the unique dynamics and fears that characterize these\u2028cases.”<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

LATITUDES had an exclusive interview with Dr. Mai Sato, UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Iran, to examine the state of human rights in the country, in the months following the conflict.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":3075,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[101],"tags":[301,257,317,450,451,303],"coauthors":[256],"class_list":["post-3074","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-international","tag-human-rights","tag-iran","tag-israel","tag-nuclear","tag-un","tag-war"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/medialatitudes.be\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3074","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/medialatitudes.be\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/medialatitudes.be\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/medialatitudes.be\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/medialatitudes.be\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=3074"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"https:\/\/medialatitudes.be\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3074\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":3086,"href":"https:\/\/medialatitudes.be\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3074\/revisions\/3086"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/medialatitudes.be\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/3075"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/medialatitudes.be\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3074"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/medialatitudes.be\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=3074"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/medialatitudes.be\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=3074"},{"taxonomy":"author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/medialatitudes.be\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/coauthors?post=3074"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}